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Performance of Electric Utilities in
Developing Countries: The Ghanaian
and Nigerian Experience
PAUL KURUK*

I.

INTRODUCTION

In the middle of the twentieth century, when independent African states embarked on industrialization programs as a way of building up their economies,' it was crystal clear to policy makers that to
succeed in their objective, an efficient electric industry needed to be
implemented. 2 While in some states the efforts to improve the electricity production capabilities took the form of expanding the already
existing thermal generating facilities bequeathed by the colonial powers, in others, the efforts were geared towards developing alternative
sources of energy such as hydro-power. 3 The expectation was that
ultimately the electric industry would be able to undertake a flexible
expansion program to meet the expected increases in demand for electricity resulting from the urbanization taking place in those
4
countries.
Electric utilities in anglophone Africa, following British tradition, were established as public corporations endowed with a measure
of autonomy in their day-to-day administration but with some mini* J.S.D. Candidate, Stanford Law School; M.A., Temple University, 1986; LL.M.,
Temple University School of Law, 1985; LL.B., University of Ghana, 1981. I am grateful to
Professor John Barton of Stanford Law School for his useful comments on an earlier draft.
1. K. NKRUMAH, DARK DAYS IN GHANA 76-77 (1972); T. KILLICK, DEVELOPMENT
ECONOMICS IN ACTION: A STUDY OF ECONOMIC POLICIES IN GHANA 45 (1978).
2. As Kwame Nkrumah, then President of Ghana, remarked in a broadcast to the nation in 1961:
All industries of any major significance require, as a basic facility, a large and reliable
source of power. In fact, the industrialisation of Europe, of America, of Canada, of
Russia and of other countries, emerged as a result of the invention of sources of
power of hitherto undreamt of size. Newer nations such as ours, which are determined by every possible means to catch up in industrial strength, must have electricity in abundance before they can expect any large-scale industrial advance.
Electricity is the basis of industrialization.
D. HART, THE VOLTA RIVER PROJECT 40 (1980).
3. LAGOS FEDERAL MINISTRY OF INFORMATION, KAINJI DAM AND THE PEOPLE 11
(1969).
4. Id.
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mum government control to ensure accountability. This Article examines electricity regulation in two African countries, Ghana and
Nigeria, with a view to determining how far the current regulatory
framework has promoted efficiency within the industry. Section Two
provides background information on the development of the electricity sector in these countries, and continues to describe the current
structure of the industry in terms of its overall production of electricity and ability to satisfy the growing demand. Section Three begins
the outline of the regulatory framework by tracing the basis of government regulation of the industry, showing the close resemblance it
has with its counterpart in Britain, and then outlines the scope of the
authority of the public entities responsible for electricity generation.
Managerial difficulties, low generating capacity, lack of capital for expansion, and a faulty rate structure are discussed in Section Four as
current problems of the industry to which solutions are proposed in
the final section.
II.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND STRUCTURE OF THE
ELECTRIC INDUSTRY

A.

Nigeria

The first power station was built in Nigeria in 1896 by the Public
Works Department of the Government of Southern Nigeria. 5 Consisting initially of two thirty kilowatt hour generating sets, it provided
just enough power to light the Government House and its most immediate vicinity from 6:00 p.m. to 11:00 p.m. daily. 6 From this modest
beginning, the power system was gradually expanded to meet increasing demand, so that by 1940, the major towns in Nigeria had been
wired. 7 Seeing the benefits of electricity, the Native Administrations,
which were separate from the Government of Southern Nigeria,8 lost
no time in promoting electricity expansion in their respective areas,
and lavishly funded the construction of electricity production and disM. MANAFA, ELECTRICITY DEVELOPMENT IN NIGERIA 1896-1972 16 (1979).
6. Id.
7. Id. at 32.
8. In the early twentieth century, direct British colonial administration was only exerted
in the Southern part of the Colony. For the remaining parts of the Colony, British influence
was by and large indirect and exercised, if at all, by a policy of indirect rule which recognized
rule of such areas by local chiefs. The local government bodies based upon these traditional
political institutions were known as the Native Administrations. For an outline of the evolution of native administrations, see T. ELIAS, NIGERIA, THE DEVELOPMENT OF ITS LAWS AND
CONSTITUTION 1-41 (1967); J. NSARKOH, LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN GHANA 1-18 (1964).

5.
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tribution networks staffed by government engineers. Electricity generation did not, however, remain a government monopoly, as a
number of private undertakings sprang up to provide power for some
industrial needs. The largest of these, the Nigerian Electricity Supply
Corporation Ltd. (NESCO), was formed mainly to support the electric power demands of the mining industry.9 Other non-governmental undertakings created at this time included the Cameroon
Development Corporation and the African Timber & Plywood Company. It became the practice of these private undertakings to sell electricity to the Public Works Department for distribution to the public
in the outlying areas. 10
The Public Works Department's obligations were simply too numerous to enable it to adequately supervise the expansion of the electric supply in Nigeria. Its duties included supervision of electricity
generation and supply as well as various civil engineering projects of
the Government." As a result, in 1946 a new government department, Nigerian Government Undertakings, began supervision of electricity generation and supply.' 2 Although this provided temporary
relief, in the long run it proved to be an unsatisfactory solution given
the obvious limitations of developing electricity under a government
department. 1 3 By way of reform, the Electricity Corporation of Nigeria (ECN) was set up in 195014 with power to generate, distribute and
sell electricity in a general commercial capacity.' 5 To provide for an
integrated national network of electricity supply, the ECN took over
all the existing government stations. 16 In 1952, the ECN took over
four stations which had been operated by the Native Administra9. M. MANAFA, supra note 5, at 27.
10. The NESCO supply for instance was distributed mainly in the towns of Jos, Vom and
Bukuru, while the power from the Cameroon Development Corporation was distributed in the
Sapele Township. See id. at 24.
11. Id. at 32.

12.

Id.

13.

Government departments suffer from problems of red tape and bureaucracy as they

usually come under excessive government control in the form of legislative reviews, ministerial
orders, civil service regulations and financial audits. See R. JAIN, MANAGEMENT OF STATE
ENTERPRISES IN INDIA: A STUDY OF THE ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT OF PUBLIC

ENTERPRISES IN INDIAN SETrING 43-44 (1967). Besides, civil servants are notorious for their
lack of expertise in running specialized industries such as the electric industry. See W.
THORNHILL, THE NATIONALISED INDUSTRIES: AN INTRODUCTION 20 (1968).

14. Electricity Corporation of Nigeria Ordinance, 2 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria
and Lagos, ch. 58 (1959) [hereinafter Electricity Corporation of Nigeria Ordinance].

15.

Id. § 16(2)(a).

16. By this time, electricity generating stations had been opened in such places as
Kaduna, Zaria, Yola, Maiduguri, Sokoto, Jos, Vom and Bukuru. Others were found at Enugu,
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tions.17 Although private undertakings continued to operate, they did

8
so under the regulation of the ECN.'
Electricity was thermally generated through the early 1950s.
Beginning in the late 1950s, however, the government seriously considered the development of hydroelectric power as a source of cheap
and abundant energy supply. In 1962, following the recommendations of a feasibility study, 19 the government constructed a dam at
Kainji, responsibility for which was placed in the hands of the Niger
Dams Authority. 20 The project was carried out at an estimated cost
of eighty-seven million dollars, 40% of which came from the Nigerian
Government, the rest being comprised of loans from the World Bank,
Italy, United Kingdom, Netherlands, the United States, and Canada. 21 With the creation of the Niger Dams Authority, there were
now in existence two governmental agencies with overlapping and, to
a large extent, conflicting duties and functions. The resultant
problems of coordination contributed to power failures and delays in
electric expansion, as well as severe operating deficits. 22 To resolve
the situation, the government in 1972 merged the two agencies into
23
one body called the National Electric Power Authority (NEPA).
The annual production of electricity in Nigeria has risen steadily:
from 2,084 million kilowatt hours in 1972, production is now over
8,800 million kilowatt hours. 24 Hydro-power is presently the main

Port Harcourt, Calaber, Victoria, Aba and Abakaliki. See M. MANAFA, supra note 5, at 34-

35.
17. Id. at 35.
18. Electricity Corporation of Nigeria Ordinance, supra note 14, § 20.
19. The engineers who provided consulting services on Nigeria's hydro-electric potential
were from the Dutch engineering firm of Netherlands Engineering Consultants (NEDECO)
and the British firm of Balfour Beatty & Co. Ltd. FEDERAL MINISTRY OF INFORMATION,
supra note 3, at 11.
20. Niger Dams Act, § 2(d) (1962). Printed in ANNUAL VOLUME OF LAWS OF THE
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA 1962, at A 95 (1962).
21. The respective contributions were the World Bank, $34,465,000; Italy, $9,416,000;
United Kingdom, $5,000,000; Netherlands, $1,000,000; United States, $997,000; Canada,
$583,000. See Niger Dams Authority, Kainji Hydro-Electric Development (Lagos, Federal
Ministry of Information, 1969); Electricity Corporation of Nigeria, Niger Dams Project, (Prepared by Netherlands Engineering Consultants and Balfour Beatty & Co.; The Hague, 1961).
22.

W. TIMS, NIGERIA: OPTIONS FOR LONG-TERM DEVELOPMENT 196 (1974).

23.

National Electric Power Authority Decree § 5 (1972). Printed in ANNUAL VOLUME

OF LAWS OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA 1972, at A 463 (1973) (hereinafter NEPA
Decree).

24.

See

U.N. ECONOMIC COMMSSION FOR AFRICA, SURVEY OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL

CONDITIONS IN AFRICA, 1983-84, at 78 (1985), and U.N. DEP'T OF INT'L ECONOMIC & SoCIAL AFFAIRS, 1984 ENERGY STATISTICS YEARBOOK, at 36 (1984) [hereinafter 1984 ENERGY
STATISTICS YEARBOOK]; U.N., ENERGY BALANCES AND ELECTRICITY PROFILES 1984, at
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source of electricity for NEPA, but additional electricity is obtained
through thermal generation, the burning of gas and coal, and
purchases from private sources. 25 The 1984 electricity production per
capita habitant was ninety-five kilowatt hours.26 However, this figure
should not be taken as an accurate reflection of the availability of electricity since supply is concentrated mainly in the major cities of the
country, with rather limited supply in parts of the country's interior,
and no supply at all in a majority of the country. For example, Lagos,
the former capital, has consistently
received a third of the total supply
27
Nigeria.
in
of electricity
B.

Ghana

The growth of the electric industry in Ghana (formerly the Gold
Coast) followed basically the same pattern as that in Nigeria. Since
its introduction into the country at the turn of the century, the development and expansion of electricity formed one of the primary objectives of the colonial government. The Electric Supply Ordinance of
192028 gave the Governor of the Gold Coast extensive powers to regulate the supply of electricity in the colony as well as in Ashanti and
the Northern Territories, 29 a responsibility which for a long time was
effected under the Electricity Division of the Public Works Department. Expansion of electricity production was rather gradual, and by
1961 the Electricity Division was operating diesel generating stations
in only twenty-two towns in the country. 30 Like the Nigerian experi459, U.N. Doc. ST/ESA/STAT/SER.W/3, U.N. Sales No. E.86.xvii.14 (1986) [hereinafter
1984 ENERGY BALANCES AND ELECTRICITY PROFILES].

25. A breakdown of electricity production shows that in 1979, 49.6% of NEPA's electricity was generated from Kainji, while 47% and 15% were obtained from gas and coal respectively. Two point eight percent of the production in the same year came from twenty-nine
diesel stations in various parts of the country. NEPA supplemented 0.47% of its needs in the
same year with purchases from the Nigerian Electricity Supply Corporation Ltd and the African Timber and Plywood Company. Federal Office of Statistics, Annual Abstracts of Statistics
1981, 90-91 (Lagos Federal Office of Statistics, 1981).
26. 1984 ENERGY STATISTICS YEARBOOK, supra note 24, at 414. The figures for 1981,
1982, and 1983 were 93 million kilowatt hours, 98 million kilowatt hours, and 98 million
kilowatt hours, respectively. Id.
27. M. MANAFA, supra note 5, at 61.
28. Electricity Supply Ordinance, 1920, 2 Laws of the Gold Coast, ch. 65 (1954).
29. In the early part of the century, Ashanti and the Northern Territories, part of present
day Ghana, were administered by the British as separate jurisdictions. For a description of the
nature of early colonial administration in the country, see T. ELIAS, GHANA AND SIERRA
LEONE: THE DEVELOPMENT OF THEIR LAWS AND CONSTITUTIONS 3-41 (1962).

30. Ghana Electricity Department, Annual Report 1960/61 at 4 (Accra: Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, 1961).
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ence, it was found that running the electric industry as part of a government department had its problems, and so to promote a faster
development of the industry, the Electricity Corporation of Ghana
(ECG) was created in 1967.3 I Private generation was also encouraged, but this was, by and large, undertaken to satisfy the industrial needs of the mining sector. 32 Private generation had become so
important that in 1964 it accounted for nearly half of the total elec33
tricity generated in the country.
Convinced of the importance of an expanded electric supply to
its ambitious program of industrialization,3 4 the government of
Ghana at the time of independence in 1957 set about developing the
country's hydro-electric potential. Even though surveys conducted
since 1915 were optimistic about the feasibility of hydro-electric generation,3 5 the colonial government had failed to respond enthusiastically to the idea.3 6 However, after receiving the necessary financial
commitment from the World Bank and the United States government,3 7 the Ghana government set up the Volta River Authority
(VRA) to construct a dam at Akosombo3 8 at a cost of some seventy
million dollars.3 9 To meet projected increases in demand, the government constructed a second dam at Kpong in the 1970s. 40
Hydro-electricity accounts for about 99% of Ghana's electricity
31.

Electricity Corporation of Ghana Decree, 1967, N.L.C.D. 125 (1967) [hereinafter

ECG Decree].
32.

33.
34.
35.

N. GUYOL, THE WORLD ELECTRIC POWER INDUSTRY 192 (1969).
GHANA COMMERCIAL BANK: Q. ECON. REV., Oct.-Dec. 1979, at 3.
D. HART, supra note 2, at 40; T. KILLICK, supra note 1, at 34-43.

A discussion of early efforts to construct a dam in Ghana can be found in J. MOXON,

VOLTA, MAN'S GREATEST LAKE 1-107 (1969). See also R. Steel, The Volta Dam: Its Prospects
and Problems, in DAMS IN AFRICA (W. Warren & N. Rubin ed. 1968).
36. The British Government backed off from a serious consideration of the project citing
its inability to meet the heavy finances required. J. MOXON, supra note 35, at 84-85.
37. Obtaining money for the project was not easy. The high level of international diplomacy that characterized the protracted negotiations leading to the approval of loans from
international institutions are described in R. GRAHAM, THE ALUMINUM INDUSTRY AND THE
THIRD WORLD 157-197 (1982).
38. Volta River Development Act 1961, 46 (1961) [hereinafter VRDA].
39. Steel, supra note 35, at 67.
40.

See L. CATALANO, DIRECTORY OF ELECTRIC UTILITIES IN DEVELOPING COUN-

TRIES (1986). The VRA provided 58.75% of this amount to cover local costs. Other financiers of the project include the Kuwaiti Fund for Arab Economic Development, Saudi
Development Fund, Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa, Canadian International
Development Agency, World Bank, European Investment Bank, and the European Development Fund. See West Africa, Nov. 14, 1977, at 2309.
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output of 5382 million kilowatt hours.4 1 In the 1970s, electricity production increased, but has since taken a plunge4 2 with production per

capita falling to as low as 113 kilowatt hours. 43 The supply of electricity in Ghana, like the Nigerian situation, is concentrated in only
the major cities, which among themselves hold a minority of the
country's population." It is estimated that only 20% of the country's
population is presently served with electricity supply. 45 The main
consumers of the VRA's hydro-electricity are Valco, 46 the ECG, the
Mines, Akosombo Textiles Factory, Akosombo Township, and the
Republic of Benin. In 1982, 62% of its total production went to
Valco, while 21%, 5%, and 11% went to the ECG, the Mines, and
the Republic of Benin respectively.4 7 The ECG, which is responsible
41.

GHANA COMMERCIAL BANK,

Q.

ECON. REV.,

July-Sept. 1979; 1984

ENERGY BAL-

ANCES AND ELECTRICITY PROFILES, supra note 24, at 394.
42. 1984 ENERGY BALANCES AND ELECTRIC PROFILES, supra note 24, at
43. 1984 ENERGY STATISTICS YEARBOOK, supra note 24, at 413. Figures

435.
for the other

years were 1981 = 415 million kilowatt hours; 1982 = 365 million kilowatt hours; 1983 173 million kilowatt hours. Id.
44. For example, Accra, the capital, and its outlying suburbs, with 10% of the country's
total population has often received about half of the electricity devoted to public use. ACCRA,
CENTRAL BUREAU OF STATISTICS: STATISTICAL YEARBOOK 1969/70 50 (1973).
45. GHANA COMMERCIAL BANK, 2 Q. ECON. REV., July-Sept. 1979, at 4.

46. Valco stands for the Volta Aluminum Company, a consortium of American aluminum companies operating an aluminum smelter in Ghana. The history behind the formation
of the company is described in J. MOXON, supra note 35.

47.

VOLTA RIVER AUTHORITY, 22ND ANNUAL REPORT AND ACCOUNTS

22 (1983). Its

power sales revenue for each class of consumer for the same year was Valco = 23%; Electricity Corporation of Ghana = 45%; Mines = 13%; and the Republic of Benin = 17%. Id. at
37. It strikes one as somewhat odd that Valco which received 62% of the total electricity
generated by the VRA should account for only 23% of its sales revenue. Part of this can be
explained by the special rates available to Valco as a base-load consumer, rates which could
not be modified under the terms of a stabilization clause in a 1962 contract between the VRA
and Valco. D. HART, supra note 2, at 66. Arts. 12-15 of the power contract between the VRA
and Valco, are reprinted in GOVERNMENT OF GHANA, THE VOLTA RIVER PROJECT: STATEMENT BY THE GOVERNMENT OF GHANA 72-75 (1961). As compared to the rates paid by
other major industrial users, the rates paid by Valco were relatively low, and so in the early
1980s, there was general pressure on Valco to agree to a rate increase. Casely-Hayford & Sims,

Renegotiating the Price and Availability of Energy, in

ESSAYS FROM THE GHANA VALCO-ESSAYS RENEGOTIATIONS 15, 23-24 (F. Tsikata ed. 1986). The controversy about Valco's rates

are discussed in Owusu, The Valco Debate, West Africa, Nov. 1, 1982 at 2826; Letter to the
Editor, West Africa, Sept. 1, 1980 at 1647; Correspondent, Imperialism and the Volta Dam:
Independence and Multinationals, West Africa, Mar. 31, 1980, at 571; Correspondent, VRA
Electricity Tariff to Valco, The Legon Observer, Apr. 11, 1980, at 123; Rejoinder: VRA Electricity Tariff to Valco, The Legon Observer, June 27, 1980, at 207. The low rates then paid by
Valco were not only unfair to Ghanaian consumers, but also made it difficult to attract new
investments in the country. For instance, Japanese, Iranian and Hungarian investors could
not proceed with their plans to establish aluminum production facilities in the country because
insufficient electricity was available. West Africa, Nov. 1, 1982, at 2828. With an agreement
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for power distribution throughout Ghana, produces electricity from
forty-one provincial diesel stations in the country. 4 Its average production of forty million kilowatt hours49 constitutes only 5% of the
ECG's requirements, the rest of its needs being supplemented by
purchases from the VRA. In 1981, it served 210,000 customers, a
50
figure that represents 12% of the country's households.
With hydro-electric power generation in the hands of the VRA,
and thermal generation remaining the charge of the ECG, there are in
effect two bodies responsible for the generation and supply of electricity in Ghana. The current situation has led to an inevitable duplication of efforts in the industry. As is to be expected, there have been
calls for a merger of the two bodies to ensure a more effective organization and management of electric supply in the country. 51
III.
A.

THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK

Public Enterprise.-A Colonial Legacy

Given their common colonial heritage, it is not surprising that
the electric industry in Ghana and Nigeria should be modelled closely
after British practice. 52 On this account, an examination of the British model would be helpful in identifying the rationale for and nature
of the present organization of the electricity industry in the two countries of study. After the World War II, the British government nationalized the electric industry along with other industries, 53 as a way
of restructuring its economy.5 4 Nationalization of these sectors was
desired for several reasons: the preemption of excesses that could be
indulged in by natural monopolies such as the electric industry, 5 the
in 1985 on new rates, the situation has now improved.

GHANA COMMERICAL BANK, Q.

ECON. REV., JAN.-MAR. 1985, AT 15.

48.

49.

Electricity Corporation of Ghana, Annual Report 1982, (1982).
1984 ENERGY STATISTICS YEARBOOK, supra note 24, at 386.

50.

INTERNATIONAL BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT, GHANA, POL-

67 (1964).
51. West Africa, Oct. 13, 1986, at 2185.
52. J. NELLIS, PUBLIC ENTERPRISES IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 12-13 (1986).
53. These include the Coal, Transportation, Iron and Steel, Bank of England, Cable and
Wireless, as well as Civil Aviation industries.
54. For a concise description of the various forces leading to nationalization in Britain,
see generally N. CHESTER, THE NATIONALISATION OF BRITISH INDUSTRY 1945-51 (1975); R.
KELF-COHEN, TWENTY YEARS OF NATIONALISATION: THE BRITISH EXPERIENCE (1969); E.
BARRY, NATIONALISATION IN BRITISH POLITICS: THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND (1965).
55. In these monopolies, power was concentrated in just a few hands, and could be used
to jeopardize essential services, or even be pitted against the government. See W. THORNHILL,
supra note 13, at 7.
ICIES AND PROGRAMS FOR ADJUSTMENT
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desire to facilitate planning of the British economy, 56 the promotion
of greater efficiency in the industries affected, 57 as well as strategic
defense purposes.5 8 Also, the chance to inject much-needed investment unavailable under private enterprise,5 9 several community welfare concerns, 6° and the redistribution of income and wealth 61
furnished further support for the move towards nationalization.
After nationalization, the options available to the government for
restructuring the industries included reorganizing them as departments of state, semi-independent bodies, local authorities, joint
boards, mixed joint-stock companies, or public corporations. 62 For a
number of industries, including the electric industry, the government
preferred to set them up as public corporations. As public corporations these industries were established as legal entities charged with
the duty of carrying out specific governmental functions in the na56. Public ownership of nationalized industries ensured control over resources which is
crucial for effective planning. D. COOMBES, STATE ENTERPRISE: BUSINESS OR POLITICS? 21
(1971).
57. With private ownership, there were too many operating units of inefficient size unwilling to merge for fear that they would lose their individual identities. Apart from this
structural problem, private industries would also be inefficiently run, where the workers do not
put in their best because they do not share in the profits. Nationalization could reverse these
trends by adopting an appropriate structure for the industry, and encouraging employee industry since the employees will now be working for a broader community instead of the shareholders. P. CURWEN, PUBLIC ENTERPRISE: A MODERN APPROACH 32 (1986).
58. It was considered unwise for the government to be strategically dependent upon external supplies of services necessary for the conduct of war or defense, such as atomic energy.
W. FRIEDMANN, THE STATE AND THE RULE OF LAW IN A MIXED ECONOMY 54 (1971).
59. Many of the industries were in very poor shape after the war and required large
investments, but private enterprise was not altogether enthusiastic in providing this because of
the low profitability of the industries. See R. KELF-COHEN, BRITISH NATIONALISATION
1945-1973 5 (1973); W. FRIEDMANN, supra note 58, at 54.
60. The welfare of the community would be promoted by the provision of basic necessities, such as power at sufficient levels to the general community at the lowest possible price. J.
REDWOOD, PUBLIC ENTERPRISE IN CRISIS: THE FUTURE OF NATIONALIZED INDUSTRIES 2

(1980). Without nationalization, this objective could not be achieved since private enterprise,
driven by its desire for profits, normally charges a higher price to those who are relatively
costly to supply. P. CURWEN, supra note 57, at 34.
61. The government felt that too much wealth and power had been concentrated in the
hands of the few individuals in the big private sector. Thus, it was hoped nationalization
would lead to the transference of power to the general community, and enable it to benefit
from the ownership of the means of production. Such benefits would be reflected in uniform
pricing schedules, equivalent wage payments in comparable industries, and the holding down
of the prices of goods and services consumed by the poor. NATIONAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OFFICE, A STUDY OF UK NATIONALIZED INDUSTRIES: THEIR ROLE IN THE ECON-

OMY AND CONTROL IN THE FUTURE 76 (1976).
62. W. THORNHILL, supra note 13, at 15-16.

524
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tional interest. 63 While subjected to some degree of control by the
executive, they were at the same time independent entities not directly
64
responsible to the legislature in their day-to-day administration.
Compared to civil servants working for the government, the staff of
the public corporations generally enjoy superior conditions of tenure,
remuneration, selection, and management. Public corporations typically have their finances separate from those of the government, 6 5 and
66
unlike joint-stock private enterprises, have no shareholders.
The public corporate form was chosen mainly because it guaranteed autonomy while still ensuring some form of government control.
Autonomy was essential to free the managers of the corporations
from the timidity and red tape of the civil service. 67 Such flexibility of
the managers, coupled with their superior managerial expertise, was
thought to augur well for the efficient entrepreneurial development of
the large industrial concerns. 6 8 Also, the absence of too much parliamentary surveillance left the public corporations free to go about the
day-to-day administration further enhancing the productive growth of
the industries. 69 In this sense, adoption of the public corporate form
could be seen as an attempt to bring an industry within the ambit of
public control while still leaving it free to pursue its business according to normal commercial principles.
In 1947 the British government set up the British Electricity Authority, 70 later renamed the Central Electricity Generating Board
(CEGB), as the public corporation responsible for the electric industry. 71 The CEGB which owns and operates the power stations and
main transmission lines in the country, sells the power produced from
the national grid to twelve Area Boards for distribution to customers
in England, Wales and Scotland. 72 Government control over the
63. See generally Drake, The Public Corporationas an Organization of Government Policy, in GOVERMENT ENTERPRISE 26 (F. Friedmann & J. Garner ed. 1970).
64. Garner, Public Corporationsin the United Kingdom, in GOVERNMENT ENTERPRISE 5
(F. Friedmann & J. Garner ed. 1970).
65. W. THORNHILL, supra note 13, at 22.
66. Id. at 23.
67. Drake, supra note 63, at 28.
68. R. POZEN, LEGAL CHOICES FOR STATE ENTERPRISES IN THE THIRD WORLD 31-32
(1976).
69. Id. at 28.
70. Electricity Act, 1947.
71. R. PRYKE, PUBLIC ENTERPRISE IN PRACTICE: THE BRITISH EXPERIENCE OF NATIONALIZATION OVER Two DECADES 11 (1971).
72. R. PRYKE, THE NATIONALIZED INDUSTRIES: POLICIES AND PERFORMANCE SINCE

1968 22 (1981).
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CEGB, like other public corporations, is exercised under statutory
provisions 73 which give the responsible Minister powers of appointment and dismissal of managers of its governing board. These statutory provisions also subject specific functions of the board to
ministerial approval. 74
B.

African Electric Utilities as Public Corporations

During the colonial era, the electric industry in Ghana and Nigeria came under a department of the colonial government, 75 influenced
largely by British practice where public ownership of the industry was
the favored mode. Even after independence, the governments of these
two countries continued to operate the industry through publicly
owned entities for obvious reasons. The electric industry, as an important part of the national infrastructure, 76 formed the basis for the
industrialization of those countries. Socially it was necessary if largescale urbanization was to take place. 77 Given the industry's monopolistic nature, and the importance of the services it provided, the respective governments deemed it necessary for strict regulation. Like
the British government, a major concern of African governments was
the exploitation of consumers that could result from leaving the industry to private enterprise. 78 The post-colonial governments left the
industry in the public domain as the private sector was unable to supply the heavy capital investment needed, 79 or if at all able, was unwilling to do so in an industry where the first years following the
investment were often marked by heavy financial losses.8 0 In addition
to fears that the private enterprise could not successfully run the electric industry, the respective governments believed that control of the
73. See the Electricity Act, 1947.
74. For instance, its pricing policies, or plans to raise loans, may be subject to such ministerial consent. See generally Robson, Ministerial Control of the Nationalised Industries, in
GOVERNMENT ENTERPRISE 79 (W. Friedmann & J. Garner ed. 1970).
75. M. MANAFA, supra note 5, at 32.

76.

Robson, Public Enterprise as a Function of Economic and Social Development, 44
& COOPERATIVE ECON. 313, 315 (1973).
77. Id.
78. Private enterprise usually charges very high prices, and so government involvement
would make rates and services available at the lowest possible prices. See Schloss, Public EnANNALS PUB.

terprise as a Form of Business Enterprise:Role, Purposeand Performance, 48 ANNALS PUB. &
COOPERATIVE ECON. 299, 302 (1977).
79. Ramanadham, Public Enterprise in the Developing Countries" The Development Content, in PUBLIC ENTERPRISE AND THE DEVELOPING WORLD 4 (V. Ramanadham ed. 1984).

80. Otigba, Non-tax Revenues: Principlesand Significance in Nigerian States, 48 ANNALS
& COOPERATIVE ECON. 183, 185 (1977).
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industry would enable them to improve the infrastructural development of their countries, as well as promote national and regional planning, thereby leading to a higher standard of living.81 In Nigeria,
where a federal system of government exists, the prevention of re82
gional rivalries was a further motive for government involvement.
The ECG and VRA in Ghana, and NEPA in Nigeria are the
main bodies responsible for the electric industry in the two countries.8 3 In establishing these public corporations, Ghana and Nigeria
hoped that the corporations' relative independence would make them
effective instruments of economic and social development during the
post-colonial period in which both countries were experiencing rapid
changes. 84 As commercial enterprises, freed from the limitations of
the civil service,8 5 they were also considered very potent government
agencies for reconstruction and economic growth,8 6 since they could
combine the efficiency and effectiveness of private enterprise in their
daily activities with a degree of responsiveness to government controls
in their policies. 87 Incidentally, the public corporate form also suited
the objectives of some foreign investors who, out of the desire to insulate their loan recipients from the vagaries of national politics, usually
required it as a pre-condition of their loans. 88 In 1967 for example,
the Government of Ghana, in response to a World Bank request,
changed the Electricity Division, then a government department, into
a public corporation in order to attract funding from the international
9
financial institution.8
Management of the electric utilities in both countries is entrusted
to a Board of Directors usually comprising a government appointee as
Chairman, leading officials from the ministries responsible for the industry, as well as some specialists in the relevant areas of finance,
81.
82.

Robson, supra note 76, at 316; Otigba, supra note 80, at 186.
Blunt, State Enterprisein Nigeria and Ghana: The End of an Era, 69 AFR. AFF. 27,

27 (1970).
83.

84.
ESSAYS

See generally ECG Decree, supra note 31, and NEPA Decree, supra note 23.

Otigba, supra note 80, at 185; see also Turkson, The History of Public Corporations,in
LAW: SUPREME COURT CENTENARY PUBLICATION 1876-1976

IN GHANAIAN

137,151 (W. Ekow-Daniels & G. Woodman ed. 1974).
85. Elias, Public and Private Enterprise in Nigeria, in PUBLIC AND PRIVATE ENTERPRISES IN MIXED ECONOMIES 87 (W. Friedmann ed. 1974).

86.

Robson, supra note 76, at 316.

87. Glentworth, Public Enterprises in Developing Countries: Some Suggestions on Creation, Organisationand Control, 12 J. ADMIN. OVERSEAS 190, 190 (1973).
88.

(1973).
89.

E. MASON & R. ASHER, THE WORLD BANK SINCE BRETTON WOODS 190, 252-254

R. POZEN, supra note 68, at 41.
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science, trade and electric utility regulation. 90 Each Board is responsible for outlining its general policy, with the chief executive usually
put in charge of the direction of specific corporate activities including
its administration and organization.9 1 Tenure on the Board varies according to the method of appointment. Persons whose membership
derives from their official positions in government retain membership
for as long as they hold their respective government offices, while the
other members are usually appointed for renewable three year
terms.

92

The electric corporations are empowered to borrow to meet any
capital expenditures necessary to discharge their functions. 93 It is the
duty of the corporations to conduct their affairs on sound commercial
lines, 94 and in particular, to set rates at levels that would ensure revenues sufficient to produce a reasonable return. Their return is measured by taking their net operating income 95 as a percentage of the
fair value of their fixed assets in operation plus an appropriate allowance for working capital. 9 6 To determine what constitutes a reasonable return, all the pertinent economic and financial considerations
are taken into account, including but not limited to the need for operating income in an amount sufficient to meet interest payments on
loans, loan repayments, and funding for expansion programs. However, when the electric corporations set the rates 97 for the supply of
electricity, they need the approval of the Minister before the rates go
98
into effect.
Regulatory powers of the corporations encompass stipulating the
general conditions for, and the supervision of, the generation and sup90. ECG Decree, supra note 31, § 3; VRDA, supra note 38, § 4; NEPA Decree, supra
note 23, § 2.
91. VRDA, supra note 38, § 5(3); ECG Decree, supra note 31, § 5(3).
92. VRDA, supra note 38, § 5(3); ECG Decree, supra note 31, § 3; NEPA Decree, supra
note 23, § 4.
93. They may charge their assets and revenues with the repayment, or issue debentures,
bonds or other securities to secure the repayment of any money so borrowed. VRDA, supra
note 38, § 22; NEPA Decree, supra note 23, § 17(l); ECG Decree, supra note 31, § 10(1).
94. VRDA, supra note 38, § 21(1); ECG Decree, supra note 31, § 11(1).
95. Section 11(3) of the ECG Decree defines "net operating operating income" as the
amount of income remaining after subtracting from the total operating revenues all charges
which in the normal conduct of business are proper to be charged to the revenue account,
including provision for adequate maintenance and straight line depreciation of assets, but
before deducting interests and other charges on borrowings. ECG Decree, supra note 31,
§ 11(3). See also NEPA Decree, supra note 23, § 13(2); VRDA, supra note 38, § 21.
96. NEPA Decree, supra note 23, § 13(2); VRDA, supra note 38, § 21.
97. ECG Decree, supra note 31, § 20 (2); NEPA Decree, supra note 23, § 42.
98. NEPA Decree, supra note 23, § 13 (1).
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ply of electricity by both public and private bodies. 99 To protect
against conflict of interest problems, the applicable statutes require
disclosure by Board members of interests they may have in companies
with which the corporations have business contracts.1°°
The corporations do not operate independently of the government which exercises control through the supervisory role of the relevant Minister. Control of the corporations is facilitated by statutory
provisions requiring each corporation to keep books and records of its
accounts which are to be audited annually, with reports of such audits
being submitted to the Government as soon as they are available.101
Where the situation demands, the Minister can investigate the financial and administrative activities of the corporation.10 2
IV.
A.

PROBLEMS OF THE INDUSTRY

Management and Autonomy

Over the years, the electric industry in Ghana and Nigeria has
continued to be plagued by a number of problems, some of which
apply generally to public corporations in Africa, 0 3 while others are
specific to the industry itself. The general problems relate to corrupt
and inefficient management,' °4 lack of effective government supervi1°6
sion, 0 5 and too much political interference from the government.
Regarding corruption, a tribunal set up to investigate the electric
industry in Nigeria unearthed startling irregularities committed by
the top echelons of the electricity corporation, 107 such as the participation by some managers in discussions of contracts in which there
were clear conflicts of interest, ° 8 and the awards of favorable contracts to a number of companies' °9 in return for kickbacks. 1 0 With
99. ECG Decree, supra note 31, § 20.
100. Members making such disclosures are required to refrain from participating in further deliberations with the Board on the contracts in question.
101. ECG Decree, supra note 31, § 14(3); VRDA, supra note 38, § 26; NEPA Decree,
supra note 23, § 18.
102. NEPA Decree, supra note 23, § 16(2).
103. J. NELLIS, supra note 52, at 11-66.
104. Frank, Public and Private Enterprise in Africa, in GOVERNMENT AND ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT 88, 119 (G. Ranis ed. 1971).
105. Blunt, supra note 82, at 28.
106. D. McHenry, The Government v. Management Controversy: Ascribing Responsibility
For the Failure of a Public Corporationin Nigeria, 4 PuB. ADMIN. & DEV. 259, 273 (1984).
107. Electricity Corporation of Nigeria Tribunal of Inquiry, Report of the Electricity Corporation of Niqeria, at 93-123 (1967) [hereinafter ECN Tribunal Report].
108. Id. at 101.
109. Id. at 102.
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regard to competence, the board members of public corporations have
been accused of lacking the necessary technical know-how or ecoThe abnomic expertise to run the state enterprises effectively. 1 1
sence of a skilled professional staff made this problem worse." 2 At
certain times, too much centralization within the industry hampered
coordination of affairs within the industry.' 1 3 Bad bookkeeping and
accounting procedures not only threw the financial administration of
the industry into disarray, but also made it impossible to set up a
strong evaluation system. 114 Frequent complaints of corrupt considerations in the making of appointments and promotions caused personnel problems which resulted in low worker morale.' 15
Even though the need for government supervision of public corporations is recognized 1 6 and provided for under the statutes," 17 such
supervision has not been effectively carried out. For instance, it was
envisaged that the accounts of the corporation would regularly be
made available to the Minister responsible."l 8 Yet, as the AuditorGeneral in Ghana has observed, such reports were rarely presented
within the required statutory period, 119 thus weakening government
surveillance. 120 The governments have also been unable to exercise
their control through the formulation of effective guiding policies.
Very few cases of formal ministerial directives on general policy have
been recorded, and ministerial intervention in policy matters was generally indirect and informal. 121 Informal influence on policy is undesirable as it both creates and heightens the potential for conflicts with
other policies that may have been decided by management. 122 Some
formal ministerial guidance is desirable given the rather broad objec110. Id. at 107.
111. Blunt, supra note 82, at 38.
112. J. NELLIS, supra note 52, at 30.
113. This problem was so bad in Nigeria that the Chief Executive Officer of the Corporation consistently refused to take his subordinates into confidence and failed to consult with
them on important government directives. ECN Tribunal Report, supra note 107, at 127.
114.

J. NELLIS, supra note 52, at 41.

115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

Id. at 132.
R. POZEN, supra note 68, at 31-32.
W. THORNHILL, supra note 13, at 20.
See, e.g., NEPA, supra note 23, § 19, and VRDA, supra note 38, § 26.
Blunt, supra note 82, at 28.

120.

R. FLOYD,

C.

GRAY & P. SHORT, PUBLIC ENTERPRISE IN MIXED ECONOMIES:

24 (1984).
121. R. POZEN, supra note 68, at 57.
122. Walters & Monsen, Managing the Nationalized Companies 25 CAL. MGT. REV. 16,
17 (1983); R. POZEN, supra note 68, at 56.
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tives laid for corporations under the statutes. For example, an electric
corporation is required to conduct its operations along sound business
lines, which includes ensuring that its revenues exceed its expenditures. This statutorily mandated break-even formula is vague, 123 and
provides no useful performance criterion for the corporation.
Although the governments may have failed to provide effective
guidance, they were quite successful in intruding politically in the affairs of the corporations.1 24 Through their appointive powers, the
Ministers often selected persons on political grounds rather than their
competence. 125 Indeed, at one time in Ghana's history, political appointments to public corporations were encouraged as a way to create
jobs for party supporters. 26 Such appointees secured the political interests of ministers, 127 and condoned the use of the corporations as a
cover for political party fund-raising.128 Tribalism has also been a
factor in the appointments, 29 and has had a divisive effect on the industry management. In Nigeria, a long-standing ethnic rivalry between the two most senior managers of the electric industry created a
split in the management and made policy coordination within the corporation extraordinarily difficult. Only when these two people were
30
removed was the industry injected with new life.'
The purpose of the Minister's power over the electric industry,
regarding electric tariffs and company accounts, is to check irregularities in the industry management and to review industry activities.
These controls, though well-intended, have hardly been effective.
First, government control over the industry's accounts cannot be expected to work in an environment where bad bookkeeping practices
have prevailed. Second, government control is ineffective where the
electric utilities have regularly failed to submit timely reports of its
activities. In addition, control of rates has been ineffective because
the government ministries are not technically equipped to evaluate the
validity of the complex rate calculations on sound economic principles. Any decision a Minister made on rates was probably based on
his government's calculation of the likely political effects of rate
123.
124.
125.
126.

Glentworth, supra note 87, at 197.
J. NELLIS, supra note 52, at 36.
R. POZEN, supra note 68, at 59.
V. RAMANADHAM, THE NATURE OF PUBLIC ENTERPRISE 200 (1984).

127.

R. POZEN, supra note 68, at 59.

128. See Ministry of Information, Report of the Commission to Enquire into the Affairs of
NADECO Ltd. (1966) cited in Blunt, supra note 82, at 33.
129. ECN Tribunal Report, supra note 107, at 132.

130.

Id. at 127-30.

Electric Utilities

1989]

changes, without reference to economic justification. Governments in
developing countries have tended to favor low rates in order to satisfy
the population.13 1 The finding that rates have remained the same for
periods as long as ten years in the countries of study 132 is lamentable.
The Minister's rate control power is double edged, and should be used
not only to invalidate exorbitant and unjustified rate increases, but
also to revise any rates that are ridiculously low.
B.

Low Generating Capacity

By far, the biggest problem facing the electric industry today is
its inability to generate enough power to satisfy the rapidly increasing
demand brought by urbanization. Energy demand is growing at more
than 5.5% in Ghana, but both the VRA and the ECG are currently
unable to meet this demand. 133 Some deterioration is observable in
the ECG's distribution system which, since 1981, has had a negative
sales growth. This is largely the result of its inability to obtain the
necessary equipment, spare parts, and other materials required for
maintenance and expansion. 134 Current supply problems in the VRA
stem from factors apparently beyond its control. One factor is that
the prolonged drought affecting the Sahelian region of West Africa
has drastically reduced the water flows into the Volta lake, the main
storage reservoir for the Volta dam, compelling the VRA to cut down
on the energy output of the dam. In Nigeria, where the growth of
electric consumption is about 20% a year, 135 the industry's paralysis
is attributed to the frequent breakdown of its units. 136 The continuing
technological advances in the industry make it difficult to obtain the
much needed spare parts to repair and maintain existing units because
the industry's main emphasis is on producing newer models, thus
making older equipment of the industry obsolete. To add insult to
injury, acts of sabotage are frequently mounted against the industry as
certain unscrupulous persons continue to steal nuts, bolts, and galvanized steel from transmission line towers at an alarming rate. 3 7 Such
unfortunate acts persist because the stolen items often fetch very lu131. J. TENDLER, ELECTRIC POWER IN BRAZIL, ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN THE PUBLIC
SECTOR 58 (1968).
132. ECN Tribunal Report, supra note 107, at 82.
133. GHANA COMMERCIAL BANK, Q. ECON. REV., Oct.-Dec. 1979, at 3.
134. INTERNATIONAL BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 50.
135. West Africa, Nov. 3, 1986, at 2300-01.
136. ECN Tribunal Report, supra note 107, at 46.
137. West Africa, Nov. 3, 1986, at 2302.
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crative prices in the market. 13
Compounding the industry's problem of generating capacity is
the absence of adequate statistics on housing and residential plans
which hinders any reasonable forecast of energy demand. 139 This
problem is made worse by the lack of trained staff to carry out market
surveys on load growth.140 Consumers are in a way to be blamed for
this too, as they have failed to provide the electric industry with advance information about their industrial power requirements so that
adequate planning could be carried out. The prevalence of illegal tapping of electricity, often with the connivance of the industry's employees, 14' taxes existing facilities and further reduces the reliability and
quality of electricity supply.
Clearly, the electric industry is in a state of crisis. Indeed, the
quality of electric supply in both countries has been so poor that
many industries have now resorted to operating more or less permanently on their own private generating plants. 142 This unenviable situation has created a big image problem. The rampant power failures
and low voltage supplies of electricity have provoked public outrage
against the management of the electric industry, making it the object
of ridicule. It is therefore not surprising that some officials go to such
43
lengths to avoid being publicly associated with the industry!
C. CapitalExpansion
The electric industry urgently needs capital investment to rehabilitate its distribution system, provide the equipment needed to restore operating efficiency, overcome suppressed demand and meet
future demand growth as it arises. Private investment has not been
forthcoming as potential investors continue to be deterred by the uncertain and low returns available when rates are kept low. The presence of inflation and devaluation further aggravates the problem
because they induce unanticipated increases in the industry's costs.
In addition, the use of devaluation of national currency as a method
of correcting the balance of payments deficit' 44 increases the local currency costs for the foreign exchange that the industry needs to pay for'
138.

Id.

139.

ECN Tribunal Report, supra note 107, at 46.

140.

Id.

141.
142.

West Africa, Nov. 3, 1986, at 2300-01.
Id.

143.
144.

Id.
For example, in March 1985, Ghana carried out one of the most massive devaluations
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imported fuel and equipment, and to make loan payments to its international financiers. Given that the regulatory framework in these
countries does not permit prompt increases of prices to reflect these
unforeseen costs, 145 the industry's revenue is correspondingly
reduced.
So far, international agencies have been the main sources of capital for expansion. 46 But this has been inadequate as these institutions
provide capital for foreign expenditures and not for locally incurred
costs, which can sometimes amount to more than half the cost of an
electric installation.' 4 7 Considering the demands made on the resources of the international financial institutions, it is not even realistic to expect them to finance the whole cost of expansion, and so a
part of this cost must be borne by the industry and the government.
The reported losses or very marginal profits of the industry 148 have
left very little money for expansion after the necessary loans and interest payments have been met. Faced with legitimate and competing
demands from other sectors of the economy, the governments have
149
been unable to adequately finance the expansion of the industry,'
leading to delays in the industry's expansion program. 50 For example, the Government of Nigeria took five years to authorize the necessary foreign exchange transfer for the purchase of spare parts to
repair broken equipment!' 5 ' Therefore, the big difficulty continues to
be that of finding sufficient capital to finance development projects.
D.

The Rate Problem

Capital expansion would be enhanced by the correction of deficiencies in the existing tariff structures in both countries. Electricity
of its curreny, from US$ 1=c2.75, to US$ I =c50. GHANA COMMERCIAL BANK, Q. ECON.
REV., Jan.-Mar. 1985, at 2-3.
145. As proposals for rate increases must await the consent of the Minister, there could be
a regulatory lag if the Minister takes a long time to approve them.
146. The Government of Ghana has obtained financial commitments from the World
Bank, the International Development Agency, the Commonwealth Development Agency, and
the European Investment Bank, for an expansion of the industry in the northern parts of the
country. See West Africa, Nov. 10, 1986, at 2379.
147. D. CAVERS & J. NELSON, ELECTRIC POWER REGULATION IN LATIN AMERICA 2
(1959).
148. In 1983 for example, the Volta River Authority announced a net loss of 290,003,000
cedis (about $9,666,700), which represented a negative rate return of 3.41% in the Government's average equity. See VOLTA RIVER AUTHORITY, supra note 47, at 12.
149. West Africa, Nov. 3, 1986, at 2301-02.
150. ECN Tribunal Report, supra note 107, at 46.
151. West Africa, Nov. 3, 1986, at 2301-02.
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has frequently been sold at well below the cost of production. For
example, for some time until the irregularity was corrected in 1981,
the Electricity Corporation of Ghana consistently bought power from
the VRA at 7.54p per kilowatt hour and sold it for a loss to domestic
customers at 6.2p per kilowatt hour. 1 52 As compared to other countries, rates in Ghana and Nigeria are not only low, but have remained
the same for several years, despite a rise in the cost of living and an
increase in operating costs. 15 3 Low rates have probably been sustained on the assumption that they will stimulate increased use of excess capacity and bring about lower average costs. But given that the
present capacity of the industry is already overburdened, that objective is no longer tenable for either country. Indeed, in times of inflation and devaluation, the revenues yielded by such low rates will
continue to fall short of the cost of service, resulting only in further
15 4
losses for the industry.
This calls for a critical review of the factors used in establishing
rates for the industry.155 The revenue requirement, the basic standard
of rate regulation, generally allows the electric industry to set rates
which will not only cover its operating costs, but will provide a rate of
return 5 6 sufficient to maintain its financial credit, and also attract
capital to cover replacement and expansion costs. Looking at the
brief provisions on rate regulation in Ghana' 57 and Nigeria 158 it can
be seen that they are quite unambiguous in their intent that the electric corporations meet this revenue requirement. There are two major
components of the revenue standard: the rate level, and the rate
structure. Determining the rate level involves first ascertaining a rate
base, which is the value of the utility's property. Second, the portion
of the utility's gross revenues that can be considered as its return after
making appropriate deductions for operating expenses, depreciation
152. See GHANA COMMERCIAL BANK, Q. ECON. REV., Jan.-Dec. 1981.
153. ECN Tribunal Report, supra note 107, at 87.
154. See supra notes 144-45 and accompanying text.
155. A discussion of the various factors affecting rate determination can be found in
United Nations, Electricity Costs and Tariffs, A General Study (Prepared by the Resources
and Transport Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs, UN Secretariat,
New York: UN 1972). See also, M. MUNASINGHE, ELECTRIC POWER POLICY (1979).
156. C. PHILIPS, THE REGULATION OF PUBLIC UTILITIES: THEORY AND PRACTICE 157

(1984).
157. VRDA, supra note 38, § 21 provides: "It shall be the duty of the Authority to conduct its affairs on sound commercial lines, in particular to carry out its functions under this
Act as to ensure that taking one year with another, its revenues are greater than its outgoings
properly chargeable to revenue account."
158. NEPA Decree, supra note 23, § 13.
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and taxes must be found. Finally, the percentage of net revenue that
the utility should be permitted to make on its property investment
1 59
must be calculated.
Two popular methods of determining the rate base in West Africa are the original and reproduction cost methods; 60 the former values properties at their acquisition cost at the time they were used,
while the latter estimates the present value of the same properties. 161
The original cost method is attractive because it not only provides a
fixed rate base, but by not being influenced by price changes also results in stable rates in the electric industry. However, although stable
rates are advantageous for consumers, they cannot be considered
healthy for the electric industry under conditions of inflation and devaluation. Therefore, use of the original cost method under these circumstances has not been helpful. The reproduction cost method is
preferable as it allows realistic adjustments to be made in the property
162
of the corporation to reflect the rising prices of goods and services.
Operating expenses that should be deducted in setting the rate
level include costs of fuel, wages, salaries, maintenance, advertising,
and research. Experience has been that the ratio of such expenses to
the income projected in establishing the general level of the utility's
electric rate has actually been exceeded, thus reducing the projected
return of the industry.163 This has been particularly evident during
periods of regulatory lag where the responsible Minister has taken a
long time to approve rate increases.
Another important deduction involves accrued depreciation cost.
Such deduction is necessary in order to recover, through revenues, the
costs invested in the property used in the production of revenue.' 64
Accrued depreciation, in this sense, amounts to a charge to customers
as a cost of the service they receive. 165 One significant point is that
the industry's depreciation policy has often been conservative. For
159. These procedures for determining the rate level may conveniently be expressed in the
formula: R = 0 + (V-D) r, where R represents total revenue required, 0 represents operating
costs, V represents the gross value of the property used in production, D represents the accrued depreciation on such property and finally, r represents the allowed rate of return. C.
PHILIPS, supra note 156, at 158.
160. See eg., VOLTA RIVER AUTHORITY, supra note 47, at 48-49.
161. M. FARRIS & R. SAMPSON, PUBLIC UTILITIES 83 (1973).
162. Id. at 85.
163. D. CAVERS & J. NELSON, supra note 147, at 124.
164. M. FARRIS & R. SAMPSON, supra note 161, at 109-11; C. PHILIPS, supra note 156, at
251.
165. C. PHILIPS, supra note 156, at 251.
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example, in Nigeria, rates were fixed in such a way that the assets had
a shorter book-life span than experience actually showed them to
have.166 In this manner, depreciation was used to ensure, quite unfairly, compulsory savings from present consumers to build up an
electric supply for future consumers.
The second major aspect of rate regulation is the determination
of the utility's rate structure which involves establishing specific rates
that particular customers are to be charged. Since electric industries
have varying degrees of monopoly power in the market area they
serve, the wisdom of establishing different rate structures for different
classes cannot be disputed.167 Such price discrimination in the industry is particularly justified when it is based on costs. 168 For example,
when compared to residential users, lower prices are charged in large
industrial sales because it costs much less to provide service since little of the industry's distribution is used. However, discrimination occurs when rates are based on differences in demand, because some
consumers would be paying more than the cost of a particular service
while others pay less.169 There have been cases in West Africa where
similar cost structures have charged use of electricity at different
rates. 170 Though discrimination may sometimes serve the useful function of extending service to a greater number of customers, especially
under conditions of decreasing costs, 17 1 it cannot be justified during
periods of rising costs, because giving improper price signals fails to
promote economic efficiency during these periods.
Conspicuously absent from the statutes is any provision for consumer participation in the determination of rates.' 7 2 The statutes only
require the submission of rates and scales for the approval of the appropriate minister. 173 Similarly, the statutes do not fashion a clear
procedure for review of disagreements about rates. Angered by the
adverse impact of rates announced by the Electricity Corporation, the
166.
167.
168.
169.

Id.
Id. at 404.
Id. at 380-88.
Id. at 384. In opposition to this, it may be argued that social reasons justify special

rates to the less wealthy.
170. United Nations, Electricity Costs and Tariffs, supra note 155, at 92.
171. This is because marginal pricing would only result in losses. C. PHILIPS, supra note
156, at 387.
172. In the case of Ghana, Valco, as the largest consumer of electricity generated by the
VRA, is represented on the Board of the VRA. But this is clearly a case of discrimination
among consumers since the rest of Ghanaian consumers are unrepresented.
173. See, e.g., § 13 (1) of the NEPA Decree, supra note 23.
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Corn Millers Association of Lagos sought relief and vacillated between the courts and the Ministry of Mines and Power. 74 The tribunal investigating the electric industry finally heard the case mainly
because the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Mines and Power,
to whom they had appealed, was sympathetic to their complaint.1 75
The result may have been different if the Permanent Secretary was not
so sympathetic. Leaving legitimate challenges about rate levels to the
whims and caprices of either the Minister or his Permanent Secretary
can cause injustice. Any group of consumers aggrieved about such
rates should be able to bring an action before a review board for a
determination of its grievance. Challenges about rates should in this
way be accorded to individual customers and not left to the sole discretion of the minister.
V.

PROPOSALS FOR REFORM

The discussion in the preceding section has raised some questions
about the validity of the arguments made in favor of public corporations adopted and operated by African governments. Hopes of obtaining an effective management under the public corporate structure
have not materialized given the reported levels of corruption and inefficiency. Public enterprise has not met its goal of autonomy as governments have interfered politically in running the corporations.
Also, the electric industry, being minimally supported by government,
continues to suffer from finance problems. The frequent breakdown
of electric production, and the low generating capacity combine to
constitute a sad commentary on the public corporations' obligation to
provide high quality services. Besides, the inequities in tariff structures belie the way corporations take consumer interests into account
when deciding rates. Clearly, the government needs to reform the
way it has run the electric industry. This section aims to outline some
proposals for remedying those defects.
A.

Public v. Private Ownership

Considering the level of dissatisfaction with the operation of public enterprise, it is not surprising that there are calls to privatize public
corporations. 176 In Britain, where the call for privatization has gath174. ECN Tribunal Report, supra note 107, at 90.
175. Id.
176. Arguments have been made for divestiture of public corporations in the conviction
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ered momentum since the late 1970s, i 7 the validity of the original
economic and social arguments in support of nationalization has been
seriously questioned. Critics of nationalization have argued that a
public sector monopoly may be even more detrimental to public interest than a private sector monopoly, 178 and given that the investment
plans of nationalized industries cannot be changed on short notice, it
has proved infeasible to use them as instruments of economic planning. 179 Besides, nationalization has not yielded the much expected
improvement in industrial relations, 8 0 and available evidence can rebut the claim about the inability of private resources to meet the capi18
tal needs of a rapidly expanding industry. '
In examining the relative performance of private and public enterprise in the electric industry in the United States, private enterprise
has scored some significant successes. 8 2 Comparing public and private enterprise on the basis of technical competence and protection of
consumer interests, Sporn presents a strong case for private involvement in the electric industry in the United States. 8 3 However, it
would be erroneous to apply his findings to Africa, where the respective national economies are in relatively early stages of economic
growth as contrasted with the United States' relatively mature economy. It would be inappropriate to adopt the African nations' statutory criteria in the United States' and Britain because both of these
countries have sufficient capital for long term investment at fixed rates
that internal reforms will make no impact on the chronic problems of the corporations. J.
NELLIS, supra note 52, at 43-44.
177. See generally PRIVATIZATION? (S. Hastings & H. Levie ed. 1983); P. CURWEN, supra
note 57, at 157-285; Heald & Steel, The Privatization of U.K. Public Enterprises, 52 ANNALS
PUB. COOPERATIVE ECON. 351 (1981).
178. J. NELLIS, supra note 52, at 44.
179. W. THORNHILL, supra note 13, at 12. Taking away the incentive of profits under
public enterprise has merely resulted in inefficiencies in the nationalized industries which appear to affect the consumers more adversely than the capitalist profit. The regulatory framework under private enterprise limits the ability of private companies to exploit the consumer,
and profits come to the companies only if the consumers are satisfied with the goods and
services. This contrasts with the situation under the nationalized industries, which do not
have as much incentive to satisfy consumer needs or provide adequate service. P. CURWEN,
supra note 57, at 159.
180. P. CURWEN, supra note 57, at 60.
181. The $440 million project undertaken by the Ohio Valley Electric Corporation stands
as a graphic illustration of the levels that private enterprise can reach in investing in the electric industry. It is significant also that private United States electric companies augment their
capacity at the rate of 20 million kilowatt hours a year. See P. SPORN, THE SOCIAL GOAL OF
ELECTRIC POWER SUPPLY IN MODERN SOCIETIES 32 (1971).
182. See generally, id.
183. Id. at 37-97.
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of return in private securities. Developing countries instead have limited amounts of such investment, and their capital markets are poorly
developed. 8 4 The fact that African nations are basically capital importing, whereas the United States is capital exporting, must be kept
in mind in comparing African nations to the United States. Also, in
contrast to the United States' industry which is one of low risk stemming from highly stable earnings, l8 5 the African electric industry is
faced with unstable costs making it a high risk relative to return.
Therefore, some form of government intervention offers the best hope
for the electric utilities in Africa.
Lest the problems described above be interpreted as a failure of
the public corporate concept, it is the view of the writer that managerial autonomy and some executive control in the limited form of principles governing the organization of public corporations are sound,
and should be retained. Problems in the manner the corporations
have so far been run should be indicative only of poor implementation
of the concept. 86 Ways of overcoming the present problems in the
running of the public corporations are given below, and it is hoped
that when profits reach levels that will attract private enterprise, African governments would then invite some form of private participation
in the industry.
B.

Management and Autonomy

One of the major issues to be tackled by way of reform in the
electric industry is the problem of management. In this context, continuous manpower planning and training programs need to be maintained so as to provide an adequate supply of skilled staff to meet the
demands of the industry. 187 Special research centers could be established in the universities and polytechnics to cater to the needs of the
industry. Also, development-oriented refresher courses need to be organized for the upper management in order to produce managers who
have a keen sense of the development objectives of the country, and
who will run the industry to fit those objectives even in the absence of
184.
tries, in
1984).
185.
186.
187.

Heath, Public Enterprises in the UK: Relevant Experiences for the Developing CounPUBLIC ENTERPRISE AND THE DEVELOPING WORLD 109, 110 (V. Ramanadham ed.
D. CAVERS & J. NELSON, supra note 147, at 6.
Blunt, supra note 82, at 34.
Hope, Improving PublicEnterpriseManagementin Developing Countries, in JOURNAL

OF GENERAL MANAGEMENT

71, 81 (1982).
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explicit guidance by the government. s8 Centralization is a problem
of the industry that should also be dealt with. Decentralization is
necessary to improve communications and the level of coordination
within and among the departments in the industry. 8 9 With such effective coordination and communication, the management will have
better control over the industry and will ensure the effective implementation of sound economic policies.
While a degree of autonomy has been granted to management,
the governments have nevertheless set controls to make the industry
publicly accountable through responsible Ministers. 90 However, the
evidence suggests that this government control has been grossly
abused with Ministers using their influence on top management to
satisfy their political and personal interests. 191 Steps should be taken
to curtail this abuse. A welcome suggestion has been made that Ministers should submit government directives to the corporation in writing.192 The possibility that such directives would be open to public
scrutiny would certainly keep Ministers from the flagrant political intrusions they make in running public enterprises such as the electric
industry.
An independent commission should also be established with
powers of review over the activities of the electric corporations. This
commission would insulate the industry and consumers from exposure to the political interests of the party in power.193 It would
weaken the heavily centralized control system which works to the
narrow political advantage of the Minister. 194 In addition, the commission should be given final review powers over any rates determined
by the electric industry, and in its reviews should be guided by sound
principles of rate regulation, taking into account existing economic
conditions affecting the industry. Needless to say, members of the
commission should be of proven ability in electric utility regulation,
with knowledge of important subjects such as economics, finance, engineering and administration. The commission should also be empowered to review company accounts and investigate any
improprieties in the general management of the industry. One urgent
188. Id. at 82.
189. Id. at 83.
190. Supra notes 83-102 and accompanying text.
191. Blunt, supra note 82, at 33.
192. Glentworth, supra note 87, at 203.
193. V. RAMANADHAM, supra note 126, at 200.
194. R. FLOYD, C. GRAY & P. SHORT, supra note 120, at 10.
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task of such a commission would be to ensure that proper accounting
principles are followed by the industry. The importance of close supervision of the industry's operating expenses19 5 cannot be overem1 96
phasized since management has indulged in wasteful expenditure.
Furthermore, the existence of a consumer council can protect
consumers from abuses perpetuated by the industry and ensure that
the industry performs its legal obligations and, in particular, provides
high quality service.' 9 7 It should be part of the duties of such a council to participate in public hearings called by the independent commission, as well as provide support to aggrieved consumers challenging
rates set by the industry. The powers of such a commission should be
clearly spelled out so that they do not unnecessarily intrude upon
managerial autonomy. Where there are irresoluble difficulties between management and the consumer council, review of such stalemates should be made by the independent commission.
C. Rate Policy
Present shortcomings in the implementation of the principles
surrounding the revenue standard must be remedied if the industry is
to have a viable rate policy. In the determination of the rate base for
example, the reproduction cost method should be adopted because it
more accurately reflects current conditions. To guard against the
problem of regulatory lag, the industry should be allowed to devise a
scheme where it can promptly escalate its rates to match increases in
98
operating expenses, pending confirmation by the commission.1
Although the automatic nature of these adjustments may be criticized, 99 it still provides the surest way of overcoming problems
caused by regulatory lag. Fear of excesses by the industry should be
allayed by the fact that the proposed commission would be empow195. C. PHILIPS, supra note 156, at 230.
196. ECN Tribunal Report, supra note 107, at 93-137.
197. In 1975 the Labour Government in Britain set up the National Consumer Council to
look into arrangements for consumer representation in the nationalized industries. The Council concluded favorably on such matters as organizing the strength of the gas and electricity
consumers on a national level, amending procedural rules on prices. The amendments allowed
a great deal of consumer influence and the appointment of a consumer council chairmen to the
Boards of the electricity industry. See Tivey, Structure and Politicsin the Nationalized Industries, 32 PARLIAMENTARY AFF. 159, 161 (1979). A historical sketch on the creation of consumer councils in Britain is found in R. KELF-COHEN, supra note 59, at 211-28.
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ered to scrutinize the new rates on their merits after they have been
set by the electric corporation.
In addition to rate scrutiny, more current depreciation policies
need to be implemented. For example, in estimating the value of the
assets for depreciation accounting, it is suggested that the reproduction rather than the original cost method be adopted. Significantly,
the electric industries have received capital investment from financial
institutions, repayable in dollars. When devaluation occurs, and the
value of the national currency therefore depreciates, an expense is incurred which the investors could not have foreseen at the last rate
determination. Clearly, if a rate increase is not allowed to compensate
for this cost, the projected return of the electric industry would be
reduced. Therefore, it is the suggestion here that the electric industry
be allowed to make appropriate adjustments for foreign exchange
costs during periods of devaluation.
VI.

CONCLUSIONS

This Article has traced the problems of the industry to poor
management, unhealthy political interference in the running of the
industry, insufficient capital for expansion and a faulty rate policy,
which is not only discriminatory in structure, but is deliberately kept
at the same low levels despite changing economic conditions. Improved training of managers and further decentralization within the
industry is a way of assuring an effective management. The creation
of independent commissions to review the activities of electricity corporations would go a long way in reducing the intrusions made by
government Ministers, while consumer councils would keep policy
makers within the industry accurately informed of consumer interests. The proposals also call for flexibility in determining rate levels
to reflect cost increases, as well as a careful review of the rate structures to eliminate uneconomic and discriminatory structures. If these
revisions are carried out to ensure that the revenue earned adequately
meets the fluctuating costs of service, the industry will be on its way
to recovery. Conceding that the inevitable rate increases will be unpopular, but they will, in the long run, benefit the industry, make it
self-supporting, and result in better services for the consumer.

